

WORKING PAPERS

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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE SPANISH CASE

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Abstract

Much has been said about the institutional determinants of transitional justice (TJ). Yet, we still have little knowledge about the determinants of citizens' attitudes towards restorative policies aimed at addressing human rights violations of the past. This paper draws on an original survey of a representative sample of Spanish citizens in 2008. One year previously, the Spanish socialist government had approved the so-called "Law of Historical Memory" that aimed at restitution for the victims of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the Francoist dictatorship (1939-1975). We analyze individual-level attitudes towards a set of TJ policies, (i.e. truth commissions, trials, and symbolic reparations) in a comprehensive overview of the field. We study the effect of different sets of variables: individual sociodemographic and ideological factors, family and socialization variables, and context-related factors. Both ideology and family victimization during the dictatorship are highly relevant in explaining individual attitudes towards TJ policies.

INTRODUCTION

The expression “transitional justice” (hereafter, TJ) refers to a set of procedures that are predominantly adopted during democratization periods –but also sometimes when democracy has been consolidated (Aguilar, 2008a; 2008b) – in order to deal with atrocities committed by the former regime. Generally speaking, TJ procedures fall into the following three broad categories: (1) justice measures aimed at punishing former perpetrators for human rights violations or at depriving them of illegitimate privileges; (2) policies aimed at material and/or symbolic reparation for the victims; and (3) truth revelation procedures. The first category includes trials as well as the lifting of statutes of limitation, which enables the prosecution of crimes. It also includes legislation expropriating former authoritarian parties of illegitimately acquired assets, and lustration, which limits the presence in public office of politicians with an authoritarian past. Reparation ranges from various forms of material compensatory policies (e.g. restitution of property rights confiscated by the former regime, or provision of pensions to the families of the victims) to symbolic measures (e.g. memorials to the victims, acts proclaiming the criminality of the former regime, or official apologies). Finally, truth revelation procedures comprise of truth commissions and declassification, which opens archives of the former secret political police to the general public.

The study of TJ is a burgeoning field of social research, but there are still a number of *lacunae* to be filled. For example, while the vast majority of the literature on TJ has focused on explaining the institutional determinants of these policies and/or their consequences,¹ there has been little academic research on public opinion views on TJ. Our paper represents a contribution in this direction.

In some existing works, e.g. Skaar (1999), the opinion or desires of citizens

¹ See Kritz (1995); McAdams (1997); Teitel (2000); Barahona de Brito, González and Aguilar (2001); Elster (1998; 2004; 2006); Nalepa (2008; 2010).

have even been inferred from the pressures exerted by social organizations. This is problematic because we cannot assume that there is a direct relationship between the demands promoted by organizations, pressure groups or lobbies, and the general preferences of the citizenry –despite the fact that there might be some connection between them. While the latter caveat is general for any policy (see Becker, 1983), it is especially outstanding in the case of TJ for a number of reasons: firstly, civil society is likely to be weakened in the aftermath of an authoritarian experience and/or a violent conflict, and organizational resources to lobby for TJ are likely to be scarce. Secondly, even if there is an underlying desire for these type of measures in society, people are not likely to openly ask for them out of fear of political destabilization, residual power of the repressive actors, and similar concerns. Finally, pressures exerted by a number of social actors aimed at advancing TJ may be simply representative of a few groups with highly intense preferences (i.e. victims and their relatives) and not of the society in general.

In addition to this, a great number of the existing scholarly contributions on bottom-up demands for TJ draws on ethnographic research including interviews and/or observational participation (Theidon, 2006; Ferreira, 1999), from interviews of specific focus groups (Grotsky, 2008; Martín Beristain, 2008; Strover y Weinstein, 2004; ICTJ, 2004) or from interviews of particular subgroups of the overall the population, i.e. victimized people (Espinoza Cuevas, *et al.* 2003; ICTJ, 2008), pressure groups (Backer 2003). In short, with very few exceptions,² scholars have relied on systematic

² A notable exception is Gibson’s (2002, 2004a, 2004b) research in South Africa. Through representative surveys at the national level his research has been centered on the reconciliatory effects of the “Commission for Truth and Reconciliation”, as well as on the social perception of justice derived from this institution. This is also the case of Nalepa (2008; 2010), who has implemented representative surveys in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic on questions related to TJ policies.

generalizable evidence on attitudes towards TJ policies.

In this paper, we make a two-fold empirical contribution to this literature: first, we explore data from a so far unexploited survey that is representative of the Spanish population, which we designed and that was implemented by the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (hereafter, CIS) in April 2008; second, this survey is a monographic study, which provides us with detailed information on different TJ measures (i.e. commissions, trials and symbolic reparations), as well as on a number of independent and control variables.³ This type of fine-grained information is a valuable resource from which we can gain satisfactory analytical leverage.

At the theoretical level, this paper makes a contribution towards a better knowledge of TJ by presenting a set of hypotheses on the determinants of individual-level attitudes on these policies, which are for the most part grounded in the literature on TJ, but also in the literature on trauma, victimization and intergenerational transmission of identities. The latter is particularly relevant for understanding the Spanish case, where the most traumatic and violent events are not recent (the Civil War took place 70 years ago; the dictatorship ended approximately 30 years ago), and therefore the great majority of the population did not experience the violations first-hand.

Finally, while our empirical work is based on the Spanish case, we expect that we will be able to generate implications for other transitional/post-transitional countries, as well as to be able to make some predictions on what is to be expected in the future—with regard to citizens' attitudes towards reconciliation— in those countries that are currently emerging from civil wars or authoritarian regimes. This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we introduce the Spanish case and we outline the importance of studying

transitional and post-transitional justice in this country. In section 3, we present the theoretical framework and hypotheses, which we test in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the findings and conclude the article.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SPAIN

The Spanish case is particularly appropriate to research TJ. The severe brutality and prolonged injustices perpetrated by the Franco regime on those who participated on the losing side in the Civil War (1936–1939), and on all those who subsequently refused to comply with its dictates (1939–1975), are well-known. Throughout the civil conflict, tens of thousands of people on both sides lost their lives as the result of both legal and extrajudicial executions.⁴ However, the political violence continued during the early years of the postwar period; estimations are that the Franco regime executed approximately 50,000 people, that the number of prisoners detained in Francoist concentration camps amounted to 300,000, and that hundreds of thousands of people were forced into exile after the Civil War. Throughout Franco's entire regime, tens of thousands of people who had been expelled from their jobs after the war as a result of their ideological leanings were denied reinstatement. The regime also rejected offering pensions or any compensation whatsoever not only to war-disabled veterans and civilians, but also to the widows and orphans of defeated combatants. Likewise, political parties, trade unions and private individuals had their assets confiscated simply for having sympathized with the Second Republic (1931–1936). Meanwhile, those who had supported the victors enjoyed numerous perks and privileges.

After Franco's death, the presence of the traumatic memory of the Civil War and the obsessive desire to avoid its repetition encouraged the main political actors and the

³ We do not deal in this paper with material reparations. These types of policies had already been implemented in Spain before the so-called "Law of Historical Memory", which most relevant content was related to other issues.

⁴ The total number of estimated deaths during the Civil War is 800,000. Among them, around 122,000 are estimated to be civilian victims of intentional lethal violence—of these, 84,095 were victims of Francoist violence, and 37,843 were victims of Leftist violence (Juliá 2004).

majority of Spanish citizens to look to the future by putting aside the thorniest aspects of the past. It was firmly believed that this was the only way to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy (Aguilar, 2002, 2008a). As Encarnacion (2008) has pointed out, in Spain, democratization was prioritized over reconciliation, at the cost of a frustrating silence imposed on the victims of Francoism. Political change in Spain was characterized by the fact that the most important rules of the new democratic game were adopted by consensus between Francoist reformists and the main moderate opposition forces. They also reached a tacit agreement to leave the bellicose and dictatorial past out of the political debate. In this context, Parliament enacted the Amnesty Law of 15 October 1977, the purpose of which was to free political prisoners and to shield the dictatorial past from any judicial proceedings.

Among the myriad of possible TJ policies that could have been adopted during the transition to democracy, only material reparation measures targeting Civil War losers were approved. Even though these sort of policies were broadened and improved on after some time, they were quite limited and fragmented; also, TJ measures such as official condemnation of the dictatorship, symbolic measures aimed at the reparation of all the victims of the dictatorship, the creation of a truth commission, or the quashing of Francoist trials –not to mention bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to trial- were never implemented. Yet, when most Spaniards thought that the most painful episodes of their history had been buried once and for all, the past erupted again. In 2000 – as a result of several thousand victims on the Republican side remaining unidentified in mass graves -a private association devoted to the location and exhumation of mass graves dating from the Civil War or its immediate aftermath (the *Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*), triggered a social and political debate about the shortcomings of the previous TJ policies.⁵

⁵ Aguilar (2008a) argues that the debate resumed due to a number of factors, a crucial

In this context, the conservative social and political forces (e.g. the *Partido Popular*) positioned themselves against “digging into the past”. In contrast, the most progressive political parties and social associations (e.g. the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* –thereafter, PSOE, and the political federation led by the former Communists -*Izquierda Unida*, thereafter IU) argued that the time had come to properly compensate the victims of the war and the dictatorship, as the shortcomings of the existing TJ measures were perpetuating past injustices. The most important quantitative and qualitative leap forward in relation to TJ legislation took place during the 2004-2008 legislative term, especially with the approval of the “Law 52/2007, of 26th December,” which “recognizes and broadens the rights and establishes measures in favor of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and the dictatorship”.⁶ Our survey was implemented in the immediate aftermath of this debate.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the context of this recent debate, Spaniards had diverging opinions and attitudes towards TJ measures. What determined these attitudes? First, the most obvious answer to this question is that, above all, personal characteristics such as ideology influenced opinions on the issue: it is plausible to think that leftist sympathizers and militants were more supportive of a law that was being promoted by a leftist governing party.⁷ Also, in Spain, given the rightist nature of the dictatorship, reparation is a somewhat “leftist” policy that should please more those on the left side of the political spectrum (not necessarily sympathizers of

one being the emergence to the public sphere of the “grandchildren of the war”.

⁶ Official State Gazette nº 310, of 27 December 2007, p.53410. It will be referred to in this article as the Reparation Law, although it tends to be called, especially in the mass media, the “Historical Memory Law” (“*Ley de la Memoria Histórica*”).

⁷ The same should apply for other minority parties that supported the law, e.g. IU, CiU, PNV, among others.

any political party). Second, most of the Spanish population of 2007 had not experienced the Civil War first-hand, and youngsters (i.e. people under 30 years old) did not even have the experience of the dictatorship. Thus personal experiences that proved relevant in explaining preferences towards TJ in other contexts,⁸ could only partially explain these attitudes. For those who had not lived under the dictatorship, victimization experiences within the family could be relevant only if there had been an intergenerational transmission of the victimization “status”. Third, since reparation policies in the 2007 Law did not focus on monetary compensations for victimized people, greed or self-interest became irrelevant in this context. Finally, regional factors could have also been important: people living in particular regions may have had different perspectives on TJ because of their different collective histories.

In this paper, we argue that attitudes towards TJ are determined by a combination of individual, familiar and context related (i.e. regional) factors. In the following pages, we outline the theoretical significance of each of these factors, and the different mechanisms by which they can have an impact on attitudes towards TJ.

Individual Factors

Individual characteristics are essential in explaining variation in views about politics; ignoring the importance of these factors implies a contextual determinism that is difficult to support analytically. The list of potentially relevant individual level factors explaining variation in our dependent variable(s) could however be endless. We only concentrate here on those that we deem most relevant theoretically.

The age of the individual is an obvious relevant factor in explaining differences in political views. With regard to TJ for events that have taken place in the past, the expectation would be for elder people to be

⁸ See, for example, Nalepa (2007) for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; David and Choi (2006) for the Czech Republic; Theidon (2006) for Peru; Gibson (2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2007) for South Africa, Biro *et al.* (2004) for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

more reluctant to support reparation policies because of their personal proximity to traumatic events. The mechanism driving this is fear, which can be more or less specific: on the one hand, people may have a specific fear of reprisal from those who would be negatively affected by these policies (i.e. ex-victims); on the other hand, people may have a more general fear of returning to the conflict or the authoritarian regime. While it could be argued that proximity to traumatic events could also be promoting a desire for reparations (and, as we shall see, this should be the case for the particular individuals having directly experienced traumatic events), we can expect risk-aversion to be generally high among those who had witnessed the civil conflict or the *ancien régime*.⁹ Furthermore, with regard to the specific fear of reprisal, we can expect it to have a differential impact on preferences over TJ depending on contextual factors such as the size of the locality where the individual lives: in larger municipalities, anonymity is greater than in smaller towns; in smaller settings, politics is more personal, and people can more easily feel that reparation policies may have specific consequences for their own security.¹⁰

The way individuals evaluate TJ measures should be clearly determined by their ability to understand not only the past in general, but also key historical events. Education is probably the single most important individual characteristic accounting for differentials in the extent to which individuals are able to do so. Yet, it may not be the only one: interest in politics and objective level of political information might also play a role on the ability to evaluate these policies.¹¹ Also, as we said,

⁹ On trauma and fear issuing from repression in authoritarian regimes see, for example, Koonings and Kruijt (1999) and Lira and Castillo (1991).

¹⁰ In the case of Spain, Aguilar (2008a) explains that in small localities (i.e. villages and small towns) personal responsibilities for past atrocities can be more easily attributed, and this makes it more difficult to discuss these issues openly.

¹¹ The latter should be particularly relevant for the case of Spain: the debate about measures of

individuals may have different views about TJ depending on their self-placement on the ideological axis. The direction of the effect will depend on the history of the country, including the trajectory of the political parties.¹² Finally, religiosity and/or ethnicity are another individual characteristic to be considered insofar as victimization affected religious and/or ethnic groups unevenly –in other words, if victimization had a religious or ethnic component.

Socialization and Family Factors

The traditional focus of sociologists on the impact of family views and values in the formation of individual perceptions about life is reasonably intuitive. The literature on intergenerational transmission of political views witnessed a rapid growth in the seventies when Styskal and Sullivan (1975: 516-7) concluded:

“Parents - the most trusted and revered of individuals in a person's early years - are the single most important force in transmitting party identification [...] that choice of party, the substantive meaning of the party for the individual and the individual's orientation toward issues are more the products of loyalties derived from parents early in one's life, when cognitive processes are relatively underdeveloped, than the result of reflective decisions about alternatives in the political arena.”

Indeed, despite the popular belief that in adolescence children will turn away from their parents in search of alternative guidance for value orientation, most empirical research reveals a striking concordance between worldviews of parents and those of their (adult) children (Acock and Bengtson, 1980; Dalhouse and Frideres, 1996; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Miller and Glass, 1989). Thus, individuals would be expected to favor TJ policies to

transitional justice has been intense in recent years, and it has had wide coverage.

¹² In the case of Spain, as we said, leftist ideology would be expected to be associated with support for TJ policies. This would be the opposite in other contexts (i.e. postcommunist settings).

the extent that their parents do so. And, not only this; we might argue that individuals will favor TJ policies if they adopt the condition of “victim” from their ancestors. But, is this a plausible hypothesis?

Psychological effects of violence and other forms of victimization (e.g. torture, sexual violence, imprisonment, etc.) have been widely studied in the academic literature on conflict (e.g. with the study of the well-known “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder” or PTSD).¹³ The specific effects of traumatic experiences over individuals' identities and behavior have however been generally overlooked (Balcells, 2007; Kalyvas, 2008). Part of the reason for this has been the unavailability of data to perform the appropriate empirical analyses. While the recent development of surveys¹⁴ and experiments¹⁵ in postwar settings has prompted the development of empirical studies to tackle these issues,¹⁶ the evidence is still quite fragmented. Also, this refers mostly to short-term effects of traumatic events.¹⁷ We do not find a much better state of the art with regard to the experiences of

¹³ According to the National Center for PTSD (2009) Post-traumatic stress disorder is an anxiety disorder that can happen to anyone who has gone through a life-threatening event.

¹⁴ I.e. Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008), Burundi (Taylor *et al.*, 2006) Colombia (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2008), Uganda (Blattman, 2008; Blattman & Annan 2007) or Indonesia (Shewfelt, 2008).

¹⁵ I.e. Paluck (2009).

¹⁶ We now have, for example, some evidence indicating that trauma provoked by civil war events tends to increase polarization of political attitudes, as well as to decrease levels of social trust in those suffering from it (Shewfelt 2008), that participation in armed groups increases postwar political participation of individuals – and very particularly, of those with wartime violent experiences (Blattman 2008). Wood (2008), for her part argues that the evidence on the effects of traumatic experiences on political mobilization (during and after the war) is mixed, as for some people this implies social isolation, while for others this becomes a way “to advocate for the return of loved ones (or at least to learn what happened and to retrieve their bodies)” (545).

¹⁷ Indeed, there is not much theorization or evidence on the long-term effects of victimization during a civil war on political identities (Balcells 2007).

individuals on dictatorships, and their ulterior preferences and opinions –during and after democratization processes. This literature has usually focused on the role of political activists or highly committed individuals (Maravall, 1978; Ferreira, 1999), with only some recent developments concerning rank and file individuals.¹⁸

The existing literature thus cannot provide an answer to the question of whether victimization generates long term consequences over attitudes that translate into support for TJ measures. Yet, we can take a straightforward view and argue that, given that personal victimization leads to support for reparation policies on a short term basis (Nalepa 2007, David and Choi, 2006, Theidon 2006, Gibson 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2007, Biro *et al.* 2004), wartime and dictatorship victimizing experiences of family ancestors should lead towards favorable attitudes with regard to reparation policies, as well. The mechanism leading towards an intergenerational transmission of these attitudes should be the same as that which explains intergenerational transmission of political identities. In short, we can make the conjecture that victimization is a condition that is transmitted to descendants through socialization processes.¹⁹

Contextual Factors

The literature on socialization has found that the family is not the unique socialization source for individuals, given that adult re-socialization experiences (both individual –couple, friends- and contextual) can erode the primary socialization effects of the parents.²⁰ Thus, the context in which

the individual lives, works and relates to other people can also have an influence on the attitudes towards a policy such as TJ. Contextual factors can be varied and complex, and so are the mechanisms by which they operate. A clear contextual variable is the political community of the individual, i.e. the locality or the region. Within the community, the individual interacts according to a particular set of cultural repertoires and discourses, and there is peer-reinforcement of these discourses.²¹ Independently of individual and family factors, if the citizens of a particular region or locality have the perception that they have been distinctively victimized during the conflict, it is plausible to think that they will hold more favorable attitudes towards TJ policies.²²

The diagram below summarizes the combination of factors that, according to our framework, will have an impact on individual preferences for TJ, and that will explain variation in these preferences among individuals. While depicted as independently affecting preferences, these factors may be also intermingled: for instance, socialization within the family can be affected by contextual factors (i.e. socialization and transmission of victimization within families may vary across regions). Yet, given the endless list of connections that could be drawn, and the impossibility of drawing clear-cut observable implications for each of these interactions, we prefer to treat them as separate factors.²³

similar argument for the Spanish and Greek cases has been defended by Martín (2004).

²¹ Contextual factors can also include work settings, friendships, etc. It is impossible to systematize all of them in a theoretical framework. Thus, we focus here on political communities.


²² In Spain, that would be the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country, as the Francoist dictatorship overtly repressed the national minorities inhabiting these territories. The subsequent political discourse in these regions, and especially of nationalist political forces, has been highly developed on the basis of these “collective” and “particularly intense” victimization experiences.

²³ Empirically, we will however explore a different set of interactions.

¹⁸ E.g. Darden (2002); Wittenberg (2006); Person (2008).

¹⁹ The stories told by parents and grandparents to their children and grandchildren are one of the clearest mechanisms by which socialization on traumatic events is conducted within the family.

²⁰ Some authors have shown the impact that the “Realignment” period had on the generations that experienced it at a certain moment of their lives. In their own words: “even apparently well-inculcated partisan habits are not immune to change under the pressure of strong period forces” (Beck and Jennings, 1991: 759). A



EMPIRICAL TEST

In this section, we will check the explanatory power of each of these factors, above, using the CIS survey data. Before presenting the results, we briefly describe the data and variables that will be included in the models.

Our survey dataset, which sampled 2,936 respondents throughout the country,²⁴ allowed us to measure support for three different types of TJ measures: (1) the creation of *truth commissions* to inquiry about past abuses, (2) the organization of *trials* to judge those responsible for these abuses, and (3) *symbolic reparations*, i.e. public recognition of the victims; withdrawal of symbols paying tribute to presumed perpetrators. Following common practice in the literature,²⁵ we operationalized support for these policies by means of different survey questions. These were:

1) For attitudes towards the creation of a truth commission: “From your point of view, should a commission of investigation

(independent from the government) be created in order to clarify human rights violations that took place under Francoism?”²⁶

2) For attitudes towards trials on human rights violations of the past: “Should the authorities that violated human rights under Francoism be taken to trial/judged?”²⁷

3) For attitudes towards symbolic reparations, we used responses (agree/disagree) to the two following statements:

a) “Symbols that pay tribute to Franco and Francoism should be withdrawn from public spaces.”²⁸

b) “There should be a monument devoted to all the victims of Francoism.”

To test our hypotheses, we include three subsets of independent and control variables in a set of step-wise binary and ordinal logistic regressions. We include a first set of independent variables measuring **individual characteristics**: (1) *Age*: we expect elder respondents to be more

²⁴ The Basque Country and Catalonia are over-represented, with 699 and 683 respondents, respectively. Obviously, we take into account this over-sampling in our analysis, so that the results are perfectly representative of the whole country.

²⁵ Nalepa (2007, 2010); Biro *et al.* (2004).

²⁶ The response options are 1= Yes; 2 = No; 3 = Doesn't Know; 4 = Doesn't Answer; we built a dummy variable with values 1= Yes, 0 = No.

²⁷ Responses are measured with a scale that goes from 1 to 3 where 1 = “completely disagree”; 3 = “completely agree”; 2 = “not agree neither disagree.”

²⁸ In both a) and b), the same scale as in 2 applies.

reluctant to support TJ measures. As we said, we also expect to find some sort of interaction between age and the size of the respondent's locality due to the anonymity provided by large vicinities. (2) *Interest in Politics*:²⁹ exposure to the public debate around the Law of Historical Memory is likely to promote clear-cut positions on the issue. We include this variable as a control.³⁰ (3) *Education*:³¹ education increases the individual's sophistication and thus her ability to produce her own views about past events; we also include this as a control. (4) *Religiosity*:³² the religious division was a significant one in the context of the Spanish civil war and the dictatorship –members of the clergy were victims of leftist violence during the conflict, and the Catholic Church sided with Franco during the Civil War and the dictatorship. Thus, we expect religiosity to have a negative impact on support for TJ measures.³³ (5) *Ideology*:³⁴ like with religiosity, we expect a clear-cut negative effect of right-wing ideology on support for TJ policies.

We include a second set of variables proxying family characteristics and **socialization**: (1) *Family Identity* during the

Civil War:³⁵ those whose family was identified with the Nationalists during the Civil war should be more negative towards TJ policies, and vice-versa. (2) *Family talked about politics*:³⁶ We include this variable as a control: the extent to which politics were talked about at home should influence the intergenerational transmission of identities and victimization. (3) *Father ideology*:³⁷ we expect a negative impact of right-wing ideology of the father on support for TJ.³⁸ (4) *Family/Individual*

³⁵ We measure this with the question: "As far as you can remember, with which of the two sides that fought the Civil War your family most identified? With the Republicans or with the Nationalists?" ["Nationalists" is the name that was given to Francoist's supporters during the Civil War]. Possible responses are: 1 = Nationalist; 2= Republican; 3= the two of them; 4= none of them. This question has been used in previous surveys implemented by the CIS in 2006 (CIS 2631), 1989 (CIS 1788), and 1980(CIS 1237). In our survey, the response rate to this question (77%) was higher than in any previous one. We include this variable in the regressions as two different dummies: *Family Nationalist Side*, and *Family Republican Side*

³⁶ "When you were a kid or adolescent, how much politics did they talk at home?" The response options are: 4= very much; 3= quite; 2= a little bit; 1= not at all.

³⁷ Two reasons explain why we decided to include the father rather than the mother's position in the left-right scale. Firstly, the correlation between the ideology of the father and the one of the mother is extremely high (0.77), so we cannot include both of them in the same regressions. Secondly, by doing so we preserve the male preeminence that is consubstantial to traditional Spanish culture. In any case, if we ran the model using the ideology of the mother, and the results (available upon request) did not change.

³⁸ This variable captures the ideology of the parents' ideology as proxied by the father's position in the left –right ideological scale (again, 1 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right). Note that this is the ideology of the father as reported by those interviewed, so there can be some report bias (i.e. the respondent bringing her father closer to her ideological positions). In the Appendix, we present some descriptive statistics of this variable that show that, despite the fact that it is correlated with self-ideology (0.55), it does not take the same values (Figure A.2).

²⁹ We proxy it with the question: Could you tell me if you are very much, quite, a little or not at all interested in politics in general"? Possible responses are 4= very much; 3= quite; 2= a little bit; 1=not at all.

³⁰ Indeed, education and interest in politics are two mandatory controls in our estimation since individuals scoring higher in one of both are much less likely to give a "does not know" sort of answer. Adding these controls helps to avoid these types of sample biases.

³¹ The variable has the values 1 for primary education or less; 2 for secondary education; 3 for university degree.

³² This is a scalar variable that goes from 1 to 6, where 1 is non-religious (the respondent identifies herself as atheist or non-religious) and 6 highly religious (i.e. the respondent goes to mass several days a week).

³³ The impact of religion on Spanish politics is not as strong as it used to be in the past, although it remains a significant intervening factor explaining for instance, voting and electoral competition (Montero *et al.*, 2008).

³⁴ This variable measures the self-reported position in the left-right scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Victimization: we take into account victimization both by the Francoist side in the Civil War and by the Francoist dictatorship.³⁹ We expect people whose ancestors (or who themselves) have been victimized to be more supportive of TJ.⁴⁰ Also, we expect victimization experiences to have a greater effect with the age of the individual: that is because the older the person, the closer she will feel the victimizing experience. The two variables included in the regressions are: (4.a) *Victimization during the Civil War*: dummy with value 1 if the respondent argues that she or a member of her family was victimized by the Francoist side during the Civil War, and value 0 if not.⁴¹ (4.b) *Victimization during the dictatorship*: dummy with value 1 if the respondent argues that she or any member of the family was victimized by the Francoist dictatorship, and value 0 if not.⁴²

A final set of variables are intended to measure **contextual factors**. We focus on regional-level factors; as we argued, the Francoist dictatorship strongly repressed

³⁹ We do not take into account victimization by the Republican side during the civil war, as we would not expect this to have straightforward effects on attitudes towards TJ. As we explained, victims of the Republican side received reparations in the past. Current TJ measures are connected to the restoration of the violations of the Francoist side in the Civil War, and the Francoist dictatorship.

⁴⁰ For some individuals these victimization experiences are personal, i.e. people that experienced the Civil War and/or the dictatorship. Yet, due to the limited number of cases in this group of people (see Table A.1. in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics on these variables), in our analyses we will include family and individual victimization experiences together. We have also run analyses without those whose victimization experiences are personal and the results are consistent.

⁴¹ Victimization includes any of the following: death in combat; death in bombardment; assassination; death penalty; disappearance; imprisonment; flight from Spain; had to hide; was expelled from work. We label this variable "Victim of Nationalist Side during CW"

⁴² Victimization includes any of the following: detention; imprisonment; was expelled from work; was fined; was forced to leave the country; was executed. We label this variable "Victim of Francoism".


cultural and linguistic minorities within Spain. This led to a collective sense of victimization among these groups, which has persisted through time. Given that our survey has representative sub-samples for the Basque Country and Catalonia – the two territories with the most distinguishable national identities and sense of collective victimization - we can easily incorporate a regional dummy variable to our regressions. In short, we expect the (1) Basque Country and (2) Catalonia dummies to have a positive effect on support for all TJ measures.

In Figure 1, we can see the distribution of the responses in the different items constituting our four dependent variables: the creation of a truth commission to investigate human rights violations under Francoism (*Truth Commissions*), the organization of trials to judge those responsible for human rights violations during Francoism (*Trials*), the withdrawal from public spaces of symbols paying tribute to Franco and Francoism (*Symbols*), and the creation of a monument devoted to all victims of Francoism (*Monument*).

These graphs indicate that, except in the first case (truth commissions) Spaniards generally support TJ policies.⁴³ This is interesting, as the strong resistance to the so-called "Law of Historical Memory" by the main conservative party (i.e. the *Partido Popular*) and the conservative mass media (i.e. the newspaper *ABC*, the radio station *COPE*) would lead us to expect a greater degree of opposition to these policies. Also, we observe that people are more prone to agreeing with symbolic reparations (building of a memorial, withdrawal of symbols) than with the other two TJ measures (truth commission, trials); trials being more supported than truth

⁴³ We have to bear in mind that the question about the creation of a truth commission has different response categories than the others. Thus, the comparison with the other three dependent variables should be done carefully. In the first case, the intermediate category of "indifferent" is absent, which may have pushed the respondents to either one of the two extremes: agree-disagree.

FIGURE 1. Variation in the Dependent Variable(s)



commissions.⁴⁴ Additionally, truth commissions receive more hesitant answers than the other policies.⁴⁵

Table 1 shows the results of the stepwise logistic regression analysis for the dependent variable Commissions, indicating the likelihood of supporting this particular reparatory measure. Model 1 includes only individual factors; Model 0 incorporates an interaction term between age and size of the locality, which should allow capturing the varying effect of age conditional on the degree of anonymity under which individuals live. We do not include this interaction in the remaining models. Models 2-4 add socialization and family factors to Model 1. In Model 4, we include another interaction, between age and victimization. Model 5 includes the context related variables.

Model 0 in Table 1 reveals a very interesting result that confirms our initial expectations regarding the interaction between the respondent's age and the size of the locality. The main effect of age is negative, meaning that the older the respondent, the less likely she is to accept the creation of commissions. Yet, this main effect of age changes depending on whether the individual lives in a small town or a large city: elder people in large cities are less reluctant to support the creation of commissions than those in small towns (in fact, the town size variable indicates that, regardless of age, the smaller the town, the more reluctant an individual will be to support commissions). Again, this can be explained by the fear of reprisals in smaller (and less anonymous) locations. This interactive effect disappears, however, when controlling for other individual level variables, especially when controlling for self position in the left-right scale and her religiosity.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ This is not surprising, and in fact consistent with patterns observed in other cases, i.e. the American South (Sheridan, 2009).

⁴⁵ The rate of "doesn't know" responses is of 16.12% for truth commissions; 14.7% for trials; 9.91% for symbols; 9.84% for monument.

⁴⁶ These results are not included in the table, but they are available upon request.

TABLE 1. Logit Regressions: Commissions

<i>Commissions</i>		<i>M0</i>	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>
Age effect	Age	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.008** (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)
	Town size	-0.144* (0.08)	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.03)	-0.027 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.03)
	Town size*age	0.003* (0.00)					
Individual level	Interest in politics		0.013 (0.06)	-0.027 (0.06)	-0.053 (0.07)	-0.052 (0.07)	-0.052 (0.07)
	Education		-0.110 (0.09)	-0.112 (0.09)	-0.127 (0.09)	-0.126 (0.09)	-0.132 (0.09)
	Religiosity		-0.175*** (0.04)	-0.151*** (0.05)	-0.130*** (0.05)	-0.129*** (0.05)	-0.133*** (0.05)
	Ideology		-0.340*** (0.03)	-0.287*** (0.04)	-0.288*** (0.04)	-0.288*** (0.04)	-0.286*** (0.04)
Socialization (ref. is both)	Family in Francoist CW			-0.382** (0.15)	-0.268* (0.16)	-0.266* (0.16)	-0.264* (0.16)
	Family in Republican side in the CW			0.075 (0.13)	0.005 (0.13)	0.003 (0.13)	-0.001 (0.13)
	Family talked about politics			0.201*** (0.07)	0.140*** (0.07)	0.139** (0.07)	0.137* (0.07)
	Father's ideology			-0.026 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)
	Victim of Francoism				0.839*** (0.13)	0.700* (0.36)	0.831*** (0.13)
	Victim of Francoists VW				0.029 (0.13)	0.030 (0.13)	0.034 (0.13)
	Age*victimization					0.003 (0.01)	
Regional differences (ref. is other)	Catalonia						-0.017 (0.14)
	Basque country						0.451* (0.27)
Constant		1.200 (0.35)	2.679 (0.34)	2.160 (0.37)	2.331 (0.38)	2.360*** (0.39)	2.326*** (0.38)
N		1704	1704	1704	1704	1704	1704
Chi2		20.33***	208.84***	229.89***	275.177***	275.349***	278.20***
Aic		2346.117	2163.602	2150.561	2109.274	2111.102	2110.250

Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

Our basic expectations about individual level variables are confirmed by Model 1. The effect of age is again negative and statistically significant; religiosity and ideology are both negatively associated to the likelihood of accepting commissions, which means the more religious and the more rightist the person, the more reluctant they are to support this TJ measure. It is somewhat surprising that education, as well as information and interest in politics, are not statistically significant. We could interpret this regularity as proof that the debate about TJ in Spain is part and parcel of the political disputes and not so much a transversal ideology-free debate.

Model 2 tests the impact of family level ideology factors. It suggests that individuals whose families sided with the Nationalists

during the Civil War are significantly less prone to accept commissions, as expected. There are no differences in the propensity of individuals whose families were on the Republican side and those whose families were divided by fighting on both sides. Thus, with respect to their family histories, the individuals are significantly less likely to accept commissions if they come from a homogenous Nationalist background; having had at least part of one's family on the Republican side increases the acceptance of this measure. Once controlling for family background, ideology of the father has no impact on the dependent variable, although the sign of this estimate is the predicted one (negative).

An interesting result drawn from this model is that individuals are more likely to

support the creation of commissions when the family used to talk about politics. This could be taken as evidence confirming the importance of socialization in the elaboration of attitudes towards TJ. Yet, this effect decreases under subsequent model specifications especially after including information about victimization.

Model 3 tests the family victimization hypotheses. Interestingly, victimization does not appear to be a homogeneous experience. Being a victim of the Francoist army in the Civil War has no impact on our dependent variable. Yet, individuals reporting experiences of victimization during Francoism are clearly more likely to accept commissions; the magnitude of this effect is quite important and it is highly statistically significant. Therefore, recent victimization appears to be more relevant than victimization during the Civil War. This result makes a lot of sense if we take into account that the truth commissions would be focused on human rights violations committed under the dictatorship, not the Civil War.

As we said, we have included an interactive term between reported victimization and age (model 4). Our expectation was that the significant impact of victimization would decrease among younger interviewees. Yet, we cannot fully confirm this conjecture as this interaction is not statistically significant (although it has a positive sign). Thus, it seems that victimization gets strongly transmitted to new generations: its impact, which is positive and highly statistically significant, does not change with the respondents' age. Note also that the main age variable effect scarcely changes and remains negative in the victimization models; this means that, for those who report past experiences of family victimization, support for transitional justice is independent of their age.

Finally, Model 5 indicates that Catalan respondents do not differ to those from other regions in their propensity to accept commissions; yet, the Basque interviewees are generally more likely to support this sort of reparation. We do not have an explanation for this divergence between these two territories.

Table 2 depicts the results for the dependent variable Trials. Model 0 again confirms our hypothesis regarding the differential effect of age in small towns and large cities. Model 1 is quite consistent with the same model in Table 1: the only relevant individual-level variables are the ideological position and the religiosity of the individual. The impact of education appears to be negative (the more educated, the less supportive), but this effect is not statistically significant.

Model 2 reveals some differences with respect to what we observed in Table 1. This time, the only significant estimate is found among those whose families sided with the Republicans during the Civil War. Those whose families sided with the Nationalists (or with both) appear to be equally reluctant to accept this punitive measure. Model 3 rejects a general impact of victimization on the likelihood of accepting bringing past perpetrators to trial: none of the victimization variables is significant. Yet, Model 4 reveals a significant interaction between age and reported victimization by the Franco Regime: only the elder interviewees reporting victimization are in favor of this measure. Respondents that report no victimization clearly reject holding trials. And younger people reporting victimization are also against this measure –which indicates that victimization experiences can indeed lead to different attitudes towards reparatory measures depending on the age of the individual. Those not having had direct victimization experiences, but indirect (through their ancestors), are less reluctant to support these types of reparations.

In this case, both regional dummies are significantly different from the national average. Respondents in the Basque Country and Catalonia are more likely to accept the holding of trials than respondents in other territories, although this effect is larger in the former than in the latter.

In tables 3 and 4 we use two different dependent variables to test the determinants of attitudes towards symbolic reparation measures. While both symbolic, these measures have diverging connotations: (1) withdrawing existing symbols of Francoism

TABLE 2. Ordinal Logit Regressions: Trials

<i>Trials</i>		<i>M0</i>	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>
Age effect	Age	-0.032*** (0.01)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.016*** (0.00)	-0.016*** (0.00)	-0.022*** (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.00)
	Town size	-0.143* (0.08)	0.031 (0.03)	0.030 (0.03)	0.030 (0.03)	0.030 (0.03)	0.032 (0.03)
	Town size*age	0.004** (0.00)					
Individual level	Interest in politics		-0.017 (0.06)	-0.017 (0.07)	-0.019 (0.07)	-0.014 (0.07)	-0.011 (0.07)
	Education		-0.136 (0.09)	-0.112 (0.09)	-0.113 (0.09)	-0.107 (0.09)	-0.120 (0.09)
	Religiosity		-0.122*** (0.04)	-0.100** (0.04)	-0.098** (0.04)	-0.090*** (0.04)	-0.081* (0.05)
	Ideology		-0.341*** (0.03)	-0.275*** (0.04)	-0.276*** (0.04)	-0.272*** (0.04)	-0.258*** (0.04)
Socialization (ref. is both)	Family in Francoist side in the Civil War			-0.219 (0.15)	-0.209 (0.15)	-0.193 (0.15)	-0.209 (0.15)
	Family in Republican side in the Civil War			0.324** (0.13)	0.327** (0.14)	0.314** (0.14)	0.242* (0.14)
	Family talked about politics			0.008 (0.07)	0.003 (0.07)	-0.008 (0.07)	-0.017 (0.07)
	Father's ideology			-0.030 (0.03)	-0.030 (0.03)	-0.030 (0.03)	-0.033 (0.03)
	Victim of Francoism				0.093 (0.13)	-0.821** (0.34)	-0.823** (0.34)
	Victim of Francoists in the Civil War				-0.027 (0.13)	-0.016 (0.13)	-0.028 (0.13)
	Age*victimization					0.020*** (0.01)	
Regional Diff. (ref. is other)	Catalonia						0.628*** (0.16)
	Basque country						0.898*** (0.30)
Cut point 1		-2.155 (0.36)	-3.567 (0.35)	-3.261 (0.38)	-3.269 (0.38)	-3.504 (0.39)	-3.423 (0.39)
Cut point 2		-1.709 (0.36)	-3.075 (0.34)	-2.764 (0.38)	-2.772 (0.38)	-3.005 (0.39)	-2.916 (0.39)
N		1597	1597	1597	1597	1597	1597
Chi2		41.938***	211.469***	227.160***	227.710***	236.057***	260.832***
Aic		2864.599	2701.069	2693.378	2696.827	2690.481	2669.705

Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

TABLE 3. Ordinal Logit Regressions: Symbols

<i>Symbols</i>		<i>M0</i>	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>
Age effect	Age	-0.032*** (0.01)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)
	Town size	-0.284*** (0.08)	-0.023 (0.03)	-0.023 (0.03)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.03)
	Town size*age	0.006*** (0.00)					
Individual level	Interest in politics		0.089 (0.06)	0.103 (0.07)	0.089 (0.07)	0.091 (0.07)	0.093 (0.07)
	Education		-0.031 (0.09)	-0.014 (0.09)	-0.032 (0.09)	-0.031 (0.09)	-0.044 (0.09)
	Religiosity		-0.250*** (0.04)	-0.220*** (0.04)	-0.209*** (0.04)	-0.208*** (0.04)	-0.203*** (0.04)
	Ideology		-0.436*** (0.03)	-0.387*** (0.04)	-0.383*** (0.04)	-0.382*** (0.04)	-0.374*** (0.04)
Socialization (ref. is both)	Family in Francoist side in the Civil War			-0.449*** (0.14)	-0.384*** (0.14)	-0.377** (0.14)	-0.386*** (0.15)
	Family in Republican side in the Civil War			0.271** (0.14)	0.183 (0.14)	0.178 (0.14)	0.121 (0.14)
	Family talked about politics			-0.007 (0.07)	-0.042 (0.07)	-0.044 (0.07)	-0.050 (0.07)
	Father's ideology			0.016 (0.03)	0.019 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)	0.020 (0.03)
	Victim of Francoism				0.366*** (0.13)	0.107 (0.36)	0.384*** (0.14)
	Victim of Francoists in the Civil War				0.248* (0.13)	0.253* (0.13)	0.234* (0.13)
	Age*victimization					0.006 (0.01)	
Regional diff. (ref. is other)	Catalonia						0.456*** (0.16)
	Basque country						1.464*** (0.36)
Cut point 1		-2.666*** (0.35)	-3.803*** (0.35)	-3.365*** (0.38)	-3.410*** (0.38)	-3.463*** (0.38)	-3.347*** (0.38)
Cut point 2		-2.171*** (0.35)	-3.217*** (0.34)	-2.773*** (0.37)	-2.815*** (0.37)	-2.867*** (0.38)	-2.743*** (0.38)
N		1807	1807	1807	1807	1807	1807
Chi2		24.772***	333.980***	351.872***	366.238***	366.817***	395.031***
Aic		3082.796	2779.588	2769.696	2759.330	2760.750	2734.537

Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

can be considered a more aggressive and controversial intervention than (2) building a monument commemorating the victims (see Figure 1), which can be perceived as more comprehensive and neutral.

Table 3 depicts the results for symbols. As before, the first model (Model 0) confirms that even though elder respondents are generally more reluctant to support this symbolic reparation, those living in larger urban areas are less so. Just as in the previous cases, the only important sociodemographic variables -in addition to respondent's age, are ideological position and religiosity. The position of the

interviewees appears, though, to be very dependent on our block of family variables (Model 2). There is an almost linear association between the family track in the civil conflict and the attitudes of respondents regarding this measure. Whenever the respondent recalls a Francoist past in her family, her likelihood of accepting this form of symbolic reparation significantly decreases in comparison to those who state they have roots on both sides. And when the individual report comes from a family having fought on the Republican side, she is more likely to accept it than when her

relatives were divided on both sides. Victimization also appears to be significantly related to our dependent variable. Note that this time the significant effect of victimization appears to be found in both estimates (victims of Francoism as well as victims of the Nationalist side during the Civil War). Interestingly, the interaction between the reference to victimization and the respondent's age is not significant, meaning that this effect appears to be equally important among respondents of all ages. Our final model (Model 5) confirms, once more, the Catalan and Basque specificity, revealing here as well that this regional effect is stronger in the case of the Basques than among Catalans.

Table 4 describes the results for the dependent variable: monument. The interaction between age and town size is only close to our consensual level of statistical significance, although the sign of this effect is the predicted one. Here we can observe a relatively different pattern with respect to the individual level effects: there is a clearly important effect of ideology (the more conservative the individual, the lower the likelihood of support for this measure); however, the religiosity estimate is not significant. The really distinctive feature of these results is the negative effect associating the respondents' education and her propensity to agree with the building of a memorial monument, which we cannot explain theoretically. The socialization hypothesis is also only partly confirmed here, being negative the coefficient for Francoist side during the Civil War, but not the others. We are also able to identify a significant effect associated with the father's ideology: contrary to what might be expected, children of more conservative fathers are less prone to accept this sort of reparation. This result might have to do with the fact that, as we said before, building a monument is interpreted as a non-risky reconciliatory measure, which may even be conceived as a kind of atonement for people who feel closer to the Francoist regime. Model 3 rejects the relevance of family victimization in the Civil War, but it confirms the relevance of victimization during Francoism. Again, this impact of victimization is stronger among

elder respondents (Model 4). Note that the hypothesis of the existence of regional specificities of the Basque Country and Catalonia is in this case rejected, which suggests that this type of symbolic reparation is more evenly supported in different parts of the country.

The patterns that emerge from this wide set of empirical results can be summarized as follows: TJ measures that could be perceived as more risky (i.e. creation of truth commissions, holding of trials), are as a consequence less widely supported by rank and file citizens. Those who are more likely to support them are people who are closer to the left, younger (and therefore less risk averse), and non-religious, but also people with a particular family background: they come from families that sided with the Republicans during the Civil War and/or were victimized during the Francoist dictatorship. Living in communities such as the Basque Country or Catalonia also makes individuals more prone to support these policies; the former region being slightly more differentiating than the latter. In contrast with these TJ measures, there are other policies that could be perceived as being less aggressive: for example, withdrawing symbols or building a memorial. These policies are more widely supported by the citizenry. This is particularly the case for memorials, which can be perceived as a comprehensive (non aggressive) measure, and can even be taken as an instrument for atonement regarding past atrocities (i.e. for Rightists). Despite these differences, at the individual level, attitudes towards symbolic measures seem to be explained by similar factors - a combination of individual, family and contextual variables - which go in a consistent direction. Among them, factors such as ideology and religiosity of the individual, as well as family victimization by the dictatorship are the most relevant; they remain robust in all models and specifications.

The way individual and contextual variables shape popular support for TJ in Spain could be a case-specific relevant insight. Yet, our empirical analysis has revealed an important conclusion for the wider academic audience: TJ measures do not appear to be reducible to a single

TABLE 4. Ordinal Logit: Monument

<i>Monuments</i>		<i>M0</i>	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>
Age effect	Age	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.018*** (0.00)	-0.017*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)
	Town size	0.086 (0.08)	-0.013 (0.03)	-0.015 (0.03)	-0.016 (0.03)	-0.019 (0.03)	-0.015 (0.03)
	Town size*age	-0.003 (0.00)					
Individual level	Interest in politics		-0.012 (0.06)	-0.030 (0.06)	-0.039 (0.06)	-0.035 (0.06)	-0.038 (0.06)
	Education		-0.401*** (0.09)	-0.429*** (0.09)	-0.441*** (0.09)	-0.438*** (0.09)	-0.443*** (0.09)
	Religiosity		-0.063 (0.04)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.038 (0.04)	-0.034 (0.04)	-0.039 (0.04)
	Ideology		-0.128*** (0.03)	-0.139*** (0.04)	-0.135*** (0.04)	-0.133*** (0.04)	-0.135*** (0.04)
Socialization (ref. is both)	Family in Francoist side in the Civil War			-0.463*** (0.14)	-0.421*** (0.14)	-0.420*** (0.14)	-0.418*** (0.14)
	Family in Republican side in the Civil War			0.062 (0.13)	0.002 (0.14)	-0.011 (0.14)	0.003 (0.14)
	Family talked about politics			0.092 (0.07)	0.070 (0.07)	0.068 (0.07)	0.068 (0.07)
	Father's ideology			0.078*** (0.03)	0.077*** (0.03)	0.079*** (0.03)	0.078*** (0.03)
	Victim of Francoism				0.292** (0.13)	-0.387 (0.35)	0.285** (0.13)
	Victim of Francoists in the Civil War				0.105 (0.13)	0.115 (0.13)	0.108 (0.13)
	Age*victimization					0.014** (0.01)	
Regional diff. (ref. is other)	Catalonia						-0.057 (0.14)
	Basque country						0.204 (0.25)
Cut point 1		-1.508*** (0.36)	-3.711*** (0.33)	-3.289*** (0.36)	-3.339*** (0.36)	-3.477*** (0.37)	-3.343*** (0.36)
Cut point 2		-0.983*** (0.36)	-3.172*** (0.33)	-2.746*** (0.36)	-2.793*** (0.36)	-2.931*** (0.37)	-2.798*** (0.36)
N		1767	1767	1767	1767	1767	1767
Chi2		24.994***	73.308***	89.129***	96.423***	100.627***	97.344***
Aic		2940.938	2898.624	2890.803	2887.509	2885.305	2890.588

Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.

dimension; according to their nature, different interventions are likely to generate different levels of popular support. Our evidence suggests that symbolic reparations tend to be overwhelmingly backed by the citizenry. In sharp contrast, interventions including public revision and eventually 'judgment of the past' generate less consensus.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper, which sought to explain determinants of popular attitudes towards TJ in contemporary Spain, represents a contribution to the specialized literature on the topic, which barely uses survey data.

We have analyzed TJ as disaggregated in different measures that can be either complementary or alternative to each other. We observe that variation in the support of TJ interventions is a combination of individual and family-level (socialization) variables. We also identify some contextual (regional) differences in the likelihood of supporting TJ in those parts of a country where strong and differentiated national identities prevail.

The general pattern that we have identified at the individual level is that the respondent's ideology and, to some extent, her religiosity are decisive determinants of support; conservative and religious people being the most reluctant to support TJ

policies. The effect of other individual level variables is at best modest. Age is also a relevant predictor of support; older interviewees being less likely to support TJ. Yet, age appears to have a differential impact across town-of-residence, the effect of being older is stronger (more negative) in smaller towns. This is in agreement with the observed resistance in small villages for TJ policies (Aguilar 2008a).

Regarding the impact of family socialization, we find that, seventy years after the Civil War and more than thirty years after the dictatorship, reported-victimization by the respondent or their relatives is crucial to explain current attitudes towards TJ. This conclusion recommends paying more attention to family experiences in the formation of political views and attitudes, especially if those were traumatic. Strikingly, the impact of victimization is unrelated to the respondent's age (technically speaking, the interaction between reported victimization and age is not significant), a finding that confirms the decisive importance of the intergenerational transmission of views about traumatic events. The only exception to this statement is the significant effect of the age parameter on the likelihood of supporting the holding of trials; one explanation for this could be that reparatory aspects of justice may be more likely to be transmitted across generations than retributive ones.

When analyzing self-reported victimization data in conjunction with variables such as ideology and religiosity, issues of endogeneity come to mind: it could be that those identified with the left were more prone to report past victimization experiences than those identified with the right. Yet, if we analyze the relationship between reported victimization and self-placement on the left-right scale (Figure A.3) we observe that, in our survey, these two variables do not correlate very highly. This, together with the fact that we control for the effect of each of these variables on the other by jointly including them in the same regression, should give us some degree of methodological comfort.

Finally, we have found that contextual factors seem to be relevant in explaining

attitudes towards TJ policies. In this paper we have focused on regional level factors, which are intuitively very relevant in the Spanish case. Yet, we should be aware of the fact that differences could also take place at lower political levels, i.e. the community (Arjona, 2008). We would argue that these contextual differences will matter conditionally on the existence of not only different victimizing experiences, but also on a minimum degree of collective self-awareness and mechanisms for its reproduction.

Overall, the results of this paper indicate that violent events and repression have long-term consequences. The condition of victim, which can be more or less specific (i.e. relating to the family or the political community), seems to travel from one generation to another, and to have clear-cut political consequences.⁴⁷ In this paper, we have focused on attitudes towards transitional policies, which are by definition connected to a violent event of the past. Yet, these effects are likely to be broader (Balcells, 2007; Wood, 2008). Finally, our work underscores the importance of micro-level data for the study of TJ, which can reveal unpredicted empirical patterns. For example, at the mere descriptive level, our study has clarified the view that Spaniards hold about this issue above and beyond the intense public debate that this country recently witnessed about its past. Our data demonstrates that Spaniards are reasonably favorable to the application of TJ policies, contrary to what has been commonly assumed. Indeed, the average Spanish citizen would have endorsed a more ambitious legal application of the principles of TJ than those contemplated in the recently approved Law of Historical Memory.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Carmil and Breznitz (1990) reached the same conclusion in their research on the effect, fifty years previously, of the trauma derived from the Holocaust experience on both the survivors and their descendants.

⁴⁸ In fact, out of the four different measures, the Law of Historical Memory only regulates the withdrawal of Francoist symbols from public spaces. The building of the memorial, which is the most widely supported in our survey, was not included in the provisions of the law.

APPENDIX

FIGURE A.1.





FIGURE A.2.



Legend: the black line represents a perfect correlation between the father and the respondent's ideology. The red line is the real regression line describing the association between father and respondent's position in the left-right scale.

FIGURE A.3.




TABLE A.1. Descriptive Statistics about Dependent and Independent Variables

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Trials	2,525	2.36	0.87	1	3
Symbols	2,667	2.49	0.81	1	3
Monuments	2,617	2.50	0.80	1	3
Commissions	2,426	0.52	0.49	0	1
Age	2,936	47.17	18.15	18	99
Town size	2,936	3.87	1.65	1	7
Interest in politics	2,919	2.08	0.88	1	4
Education	2,929	1.91	0.70	1	3
Religiosity	2,868	2.50	1.35	1	6
Ideology	2,435	4.39	1.74	1	10
Victim of Francoism	2,936	0.24	0.42	0	1
Victim of Francoists in CW	2,936	0.31	0.46	0	1
Family in the Francoist side in the CW	2,936	0.15	0.36	0	1
Family in the Republican side in the CW	2,936	0.32	0.46	0	1
Family talked about politics	2,854	1.91	0.82	1	4
Father's ideology	2,103	4.82	2.21	1	10
Catalonia	2,936	0.23	0.42	0	1
Basque country	2,936	0.23	0.42	0	1

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